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Modelling What There Is: Ontologising  
in a Multidimensional World 
Willard McCarty ∗ 
Abstract: »Modellieren was ist: Ontologisierung in einer multidimensionalen 
Welt«. The incursion of digital computing machinery into the public sphere and 
the return of “ontology” from philosophical exile occurred almost simultane-
ously, circa 1948. In this essay I ask, what do the modelling machine and phi-
losophers’ irreconcilable accounts of “what there is” have to do with each oth-
er? Are the ontological pluralism of the former and the multi-centric multi-
naturalism of the latter kin? If so, then recent anthropology has much to say to 
digital humanities. 
Keywords: Modelling, ontology, anthropology, multidimensionality, semantic 
stretch. 
[T]he universe has always appeared to the natural mind as a kind of enigma of which 
the key must be sought in the shape of some illuminating or power-bringing word or 
name. That word names the universe’s principle, and to possess it is after a fashion 
to possess the universe itself. “God”, “Matter”, “Reason”, “the Absolute”, “Energy”, 
are so many solving names. You can rest when you have them…. But if you follow 
the pragmatic method, you cannot look on any such word as closing your quest…. 
[Each word] appears less as a solution… than as a program for more work …. (Wil-
liam James, Pragmatism 1907) 
The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same 
world with different labels attached. (Edward Sapir, The status of linguistics as a 
science 1929)  
The only way you can catch yourself in the act of reflecting on yourself is by becom-
ing another self – a self which, when it looks down on your reflecting self, will not 
be included in the reflection. If you want to understand yourself better, you always 
have to keep on the move. (Jonathan Rée, I See a Voice 1999) 
1.  A Mid Twentieth Century Co-Occurence 
These days, for perfectly obvious reasons, some of us find ourselves telling a 
Spenglerian Untergang des Abendlandes. The evening news confirms that we 
are all going to hell in a handbasket. But when I look around what I see is an 
abundance of compelling scholarship in many disciplines, scholarship that 
                                                             
∗  Williard McCarty, Department of Digital Humanities, King’s College London, Strand, London 
WC2R 2LS, United Kingdom; willard.mccarty@mccarty.org.uk. 
HSR Suppl. 31 (2018)  │  34 
beckons us to interconnect our own work with it and to connect both to the 
world we live in. The connections to be made are reciprocal and recursive: we 
give that others may give back, do ut des, again and again in a cycle that 
changes both. 
Here my aim is more modest than such a large project would suggest but 
still indicative of the benefits. My aim is to suggest – I can do no more than 
that – some of what might result from growing connections with anthropology 
and related disciplines. Anthropologists, you may know, have been interested 
in doing the reverse since at least 1962 (Hymes 1965) and were thinking along 
similar lines from the early 1940s (Heims 1991, chap. 2). Today both sides 
have much more to offer each other than was the case then. 
My story begins with a curious mid-twentieth century co-occurrence in the 
Anglo-American world: of the digital computer (which must be told what there 
is) and of the return from philosophical exile of ontology (the study of what 
there is – or, as Ian Hacking says (2002, 2), of “whatever we individuate and 
allow ourselves to talk about”).1 Stumbling on this co-occurrence led me to 
wonder how the two co-occurrents might be connected beyond computer scien-
tists’ adoption of the term in the late 1970s.2 You may know that thirty years 
earlier, just as the public was becoming aware of computers, philosopher 
Willard Van Orman Quine began giving serious attention not just to ontology 
but to ontologies in the plural.3 (In Germany the co-occurrence happened earli-
er, with Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit in 1927 and Konrad Zuse’s Z-series 
machines from ca. 1935, a year before Turing’s foundational paper.4) I asked 
myself, what might there be in these co-occurrences to help us explain them? 
But then I noticed something else: the rather dramatic and fruitful career, seed-
ed by Quine, that ontology has taken in theoretical anthropology and related 
disciplines for the last few decades. So my question became also this: what 
                                                             
1  A convenient date for the first public exhibition of a large-scale digital computer is the 
launch of the Selective Sequence Electronic Calculator (SSEC) at IBM World Headquarters 
(New York) in 1948, visible from street-level until 1952 (McCarty 2011, viii). For ontology 
see note 3. 
2  For early examples see Kosslyn 1978 (drawing inter alia on Goodman 1968) and McCarthy 
1980, Alexander et al 1986. Formal definition came with Gruber 1995. See also Gruber 
2009, Sowa 2000 (51-131) and Zúñiga 2001. For related activities in Natural Language Pro-
cessing see e.g. Margaret Masterman’s work in the 1950s and 1960s (Priss and Old 2009; 
Sowa 2010 [245-50]); for database design see Sølvberg 1979; Ramsay 2004 (195). 
3  See Quine 1948, (1953) 1961 (his note on “Identity, ostension, and hypothesis”, p. 169, in 
particular), (1960) 2013 and 1969. For the status of ontology at the time see Feibleman 
1949. 
4  At the very beginning of Sein und Zeit ([1927] 2001, §3) Heidegger makes a distinction 
between ontological (Being as such) and ontic (regional or specific Being, i.e. delimited and 
implicitly temporal, as studied in the sciences); see Steiner 1978 (79-80). For Zuse’s devel-
opment of his stored-program computer see Zuse (1993) 2007 (chap. 3). Heidegger’s work 
became known in Anglophone computer science with Dreyfus 1972 and important in that 
discipline thanks to Winograd and Flores 1987. 
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might we learn about the creative potential of digital machines from the schol-
ars of human historical and contemporary alterity? 
Nothing in the literature suggests that computer scientists took much notice 
of philosophy when they started talking about ontology. Perhaps they thought 
they didn’t need to, since ontology is obviously fundamental to computing 
machinery: after all, to do any useful work the machine must be given a model 
of what there is (Smith 1985). But the complexity of the world and limitations 
of time constrain any implementable ontology to be a version of the domain to 
which it applies, that is, to be an ontology, one of many. Hence the implicit, 
more specific and possibly important connection between the digital machine 
and both Quine’s and Heidegger’s pluralisation. 
2. The Popularity of “Model”, Many Ontologies and 
Cosmological Change 
To get further with this, let me take a different tack. When we think about 
models carefully, as Nelson Goodman did in Languages of Art (1968), we can 
become quite annoyed, as he did, at the ungovernable, viral appeal of the word 
“model”. For us its sloppy use makes its specifically computational sense diffi-
cult to pick out; in consequence, we are apt to miss what is genuinely new and 
so have no convincing answer other than “more, faster” to rightfully skeptical 
colleagues. But its popularity is an inescapable fact, I realised. So I started to 
ask, why is it so popular? Was the invention of the digital machine a like re-
sponse, as the coordinated surge of word and thing would suggest? [Figure 1]. 
Might the same be true for “ontology”? What can we learn from that? What are 
they responses to? Answers aren’t as obvious as may seem: Plato’s Symposium 
teaches that we tend to go for what is achingly present in its absence, and so 
want, and thus desire. Rather than go for a quick dismissal by reference to 
technological determinism, pure coincidence or the fog of a Zeitgeist, I won-
dered if we might be able to identify a Foucauldian “historical a priori”5 – or, 
to paraphrase Jonathan Rée, that metaphysical notion which, in the middle of 
the last century, infiltrated ordinary common sense and became a real force in 
the world (1999, 382). 
Consider, for example, Quine’s argument that translation is inevitably inde-
terminate 2013 [1960] chap. 2), from which he concludes that we can do no 
better than many incompatible stock-takings of the world’s goods. Put that next 
to Quine’s friend and reader Thomas Kuhn’s argument two years later in The 
                                                             
5  The phrase is from Georges Canguilhem’s review of his former student Michel Foucault’s Les 
mots et le choses (1966) in Canguilhem 2005/1967, 90; quoted and discussed in Hacking 
2002, 5. 
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Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2012 [1962]) for the inevitability of succes-
sive, incompatible, indeed incommensurable paradigms. Consider also my 
favourite example of a clarion-call within digital humanities: the American 
literary critic Louis Milic’s short article, published four years after Structure, in 
which he wrote that, “We are still not thinking of the computer as anything but 
a myriad of clerks or assistants in one convenient console” (and I would go so 
far as to say “a myriad of servants”, since for us their far quicker, less intrusive 
and better service is so discrete as to be all but invisible). “The true nature of 
the machine is unknown to us…”, he went on to say (and I would add, un-
known because this “nature” is not natural, not a given, but an emergent recur-
sive co-creation of human and machine). Milic saw, as he said, that “Its intelli-
gence and ours must be made complementary….”, and so implied the crucial 
beyond-the-Turing-Test question of what we take intelligence to be. He went 
on: “Thinking in a new way is not an easy accomplishment. It means”, he said, 
“reorientation of all the coordinates of our existence” (1966, 4-5, my empha-
sis). It means, in other words, a cosmological reconfiguration. He called his 
brief article, “The next step”. It was, I like to point out, the first article in the 
first issue of the first journal in digital humanities. I don’t think we’ve taken 
that step yet. 
3. The “Ontological Turn” in Anthropology 
I intended no causal implications when I said that Quine seeded later develop-
ments in anthropology, though his thought-seed did germinate there. What he 
actually did, on record, was to draw an analogy between the ontologising phi-
losopher and a fictional anthropological linguist attempting to translate an 
imagined native’s exclamation at the sight of a rabbit (2013 [1960], 25ff.). 
Such was and is the field anthropologist’s dilemma, the core scenario to which 
some anthropologists have responded by making what has been called “the 
ontological turn”, away from the epistemological angst Quine depicted to 
something rather new.6 Commenting on Eduardo Kohn’s How Forests Think: 
Toward an Anthropology beyond the Human (2013), for example, Philippe 
Descola refers to 
[the] general predicament that some of us… find ourselves enmeshed in. To 
put it simply, the project of repopulating the social sciences with nonhuman 
beings, and thus of shifting the focus… toward the interactions of humans 
with (and between) animals, plants, physical processes, artifacts, images, and 
other forms of beings… (2014) 
                                                             
6  Increasingly noisy since Henare, Holbraad and Wastell identified “a quiet revolution” and 
applied the term “ontological turn” to it (2007, 1, 7). 
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Modelling (we might say) everywhere, of everything, by every being with 
agency.  
The arguments quickly become complex, intricate, difficult. I can only pre-
sent a sliver. Almira Salmond’s helpful overview in the journal Hau sorts the 
enthusiastic confusion this turn has become into “three ethnographic strategies 
for addressing ontological alterity” (2014): Tim Ingold’s, Descola’s and the 
one she favours, which for want of space is my sole focus here. She calls it 
“recursive” because it draws recursively, transformatively on “the imaginative 
powers of the… peoples and collectives” whom anthropology proposes to 
explain.7 Its leading proponent, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, defines it in stark 
contrast to what he calls “our modern cosmological vulgate”: the multicultural-
ist supposition of “a single world or nature… around which different partial 
cultural views orbit” (2010, 329). This vulgate sounds pleasingly liberal and 
democratic. Look closely, he argues, and the single world it supposes turns out 
to be our world universalised. In other words, take a step back and this world 
begins to look very much like Michel Foucault’s invocation of Jeremy Ben-
tham’s panopticon.8 In the late eighteenth century Bentham designed a cylin-
drical prison with a central watch-tower from which all inmates could be se-
cretly observed. Because no inmate could know when he was being watched, 
the panopticon induced “the sentiment of an invisible omniscience”9 – a crip-
pling, economical god’s-eye view. Hence the predicament of those entrapped 
by their very visibility, as Foucault has said, and thus Viveiros de Castro’s 
metaphor for the colonising grip of that panoptic cosmological vulgate.  
4. The Multidimensionality of the Real and Our “Next 
Step” 
Ontology had to change before the turn in anthropology could be made, from 
elaboration of a “great chain of being” to a probing which reveals multiple 
ontologies.10 The modelling machine, working through many disciplines, has 
undoubtedly been an influential part of this change, so also the viral spread of 
the term “model”. Remarkably, throughout the panic of relativism in the “sci-
ence wars”,11 modelling and the many ontologies it makes operational have 
diversified not destroyed the idea of the real. The anthropologists I have quoted 
                                                             
7  Viveiros de Castro 2014 [2009], 40. 
8  Foucault, “Panopticism”, in Foucault 1995 [1975], 195-228; plate 3 shows Bentham’s de-
sign). See Bentham1995. 
9  A widely quoted phrase, not in Bentham’s works, often attributed to an anonymous archi-
tect. See Nugent 2011; Lyon 2006. 
10  Lovejoy 2001 [1936]; see also Lovejoy 1909. 
11  Hacking 1999; Geertz 1984. 
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have responded by taking “the enemy’s point of view” seriously – Viveiros de 
Castro’s phrase 1992 [1986] – as a recursive instrument of disciplinary self-
redefinition. Such recursion is no stranger to modelling. Ancient historian and 
anthropological fellow-traveller G. E. R. Lloyd has used his half-century of 
meticulous comparative analyses of ancient Greek and Chinese thought to draw 
out the “multidimensionality” of the real and to show the “semantic stretch” it 
requires of us.12 We might call this the agile modelling of an endlessly faceted 
world. Thirty-five years ago Ian Hacking, in Representing and Intervening 
(1983), argued cogently that new things become real by means of manipulatory 
experimental modelling. In his essay “Historical Ontology”, he has asked, 
echoing Foucault: “if we are concerned with the coming into being of the very 
possibility of some objects, what is that if not historical?” What does such 
reasoning lead to if not specific, local ontologies, “molded in time”?13 
What is to be done with these anthropological, historical and philosophical 
inflections of modelling gone viral – with the possibilities they suggest and the 
demanding help they offer for growing nascent digital humanities into one of 
the literae humaniores? That’s the question I struggle with. Half a century on 
from Louis Milic’s “The Next Step” I wonder what we can say his cosmologi-
cal reconfiguration would entail if we took it seriously by taking on the anthro-
pologists’ challenge. To use Clifford Geertz’s terms, it would mean something 
far beyond the mimetic “modelling of” real-world data, beyond also “modelling 
for” objects that begin as more or less definite ideas and aim at concrete reali-
sation.14 Both of these will, of course, remain valuable things to do. But they 
are hardly sufficient for a computing of as well as in the interpretative disci-
plines. (Let us be done with the crippling fright of the technoscience which 
makes our beloved machine possible and with the equally damaging ignorance 
of social thought, and so call these disciplines the human sciences.) 
What I think taking Milic’s next step might lead to most immediately is a 
concerted, experimental, hardware-actualised enquiry into what we mean by 
“intelligence”, by “reason”, by “cognition” – recursively involving the ma-
chine’s point of view with our own as both develop in interaction with each 
other. This is not the already well developed programme to demonstrate that 
cognition is computational, rather to find out through a back-and-forth conver-
sation what it is.15 It would mean enquiring into the machine’s cosmology, as it 
is now, as it could become. This enquiry would mean, to paraphrase Viveiros 
                                                             
12  Lloyd 2015, 5. See Inwood and McCarty 2010, contributions to which embrace all three of 
Salmond’s ethnographic approaches to ontology. For a summary of Lloyd’s work, <https:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G._E._R._Lloyd> (Accessed December 19, 2016). 
13  Hacking 2002, 2, 4; Foucault 1984. See also Lovejoy 1909. 
14  For a discussion see McCarty 2013 [2005], 24; referring to Geertz 1993 [1973], 93. 
15  Yes, some of this goes on in the cognitive sciences, but we in the humanities have not 
included ourselves, nor have these sciences looked often to the humanities for more than 
window-dressing. 
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de Castro, treating ideas indigenous to digital hardware as concepts to think 
with, then following the consequences, defining the range of possibilities these 
concepts presuppose, the conceptual persona they make possible, the reality 
they delimit (2014, 187). This is in no way to disrespect the Amazonians and 
the others from whom Viveiros de Castro and colleagues have learned so 
much. It is, rather, to ask if we can learn from these anthropologists in turn 
what it means to pull oneself away from the narcissistic self-entrapment that 
Joseph Weizenbaum discovered in the mid-1960s when users of his conversa-
tional program Eliza mistook it for their confessor.16 It is to ask whether the 
ontological turn in the anthropological sense has taken hold in digital humani-
ties. 
Is it not nascent in what the scholar-programmer already does, most when 
designing, building and refining simulations? Elsewhere I have argued that the 
great lesson to be learned from simulation – which is modelling turned loose to 
go where it can – is that it shows computing to be just such a producer of fic-
tion: an instrument not so much for nailing down facts (although it can do that) 
but for imagining them, acting them out, solidifying them, in some cases giving 
us a new (tentative) reality to probe (McCarty 2018). I know of no better ex-
ample of this than John Wall’s simulation of John Donne’s Gunpowder Day 
sermon in 1622 as it might have been delivered from the long-vanished Paul’s 
Cross preaching station adjacent to the medieval St Paul’s, which the Great 
Fire of London destroyed in 1666. With his Virtual Paul’s Cross Wall explores 
“what we are doing when we believe we have discovered, from our experience 
with a digital environment, things about past events that are not documented by 
traditional sources” (2016,283). That’s a cliff-edge, inviting flight, a fiction (to 
paraphrase Viveiros de Castro) that is historiographical, but historiography that 
is not fictional: a digital machine’s perspective on the sermon preached on a 
semi-fictional occasion by a semi-fictional John Donne from a semi-fictional 
Paul’s Cross in a semi-fictional space to a semi-fictional crowd. Ironically we 
have very good reason to think that it is a better, more truthful fiction than we 
get by pretending that Donne’s published words, which he wrote down some-
time later from the notes he used while preaching, are the real sermon. 
In 1962 Cambridge linguist Margaret Masterman proposed that the comput-
er could become a “telescope of the mind”, changing, as the early telescope 
did, our whole conception of the world (1962, 38-9). Some toss this off. But is 
the instrument as unproblematic as her metaphor seems to imply? To echo 
Hacking (1983, 186-209), do we see through, or see through, a telescope? 
Today (just as in microscopy) optoelectronics interpose a hermeneutic black-
box between the eye and its object, complicating – but not essentially altering – 
                                                             
16  See esp. the introduction to Weizenbaum 1976. Note that according to its author, Cannibal 
Metaphysics is a commentary on an unwritten, fictional book entitled Anti-Narcissus: An-
thropology as a Minor Science (Viveiros de Castro 2014 [2009], 39). 
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the philosopher’s question. For when Galileo looked through his occhialino 
much of what he saw had been seen before, but the differences were enough to 
make “what was” “momentarily mutable”, stuff of the eye reshaped by his 
mind into “a compelling argument for Copernicanism”.17 
Disciplines, I like to say, are not places of arrival, clubs to be joined, identi-
ties to assume or platforms of visibility, but starting-points. So the question is: 
where from here? There are many maps. 




                                                             
17  Thanks to Crystal Hall (Bowdoin) for the commentary on Galileo, in private e-mail, 6/1/17. 
The literature is extensive; see esp. Lipking 2014; Biagioli 2006, chap. 2. 
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6.  Discussion 
NBD: Nina Bonderup Dorn 
RB: Rens Bod 
GO: Gunnar Olsson 
FJ: Fotis Jannidis 
WM: Willard McCarty 
 
In her dedicated response NBD singled out the alterity of worlds, especially its 
connection with the concept of situated knowledge in her own paper. She ques-
tioned the implications of “ontological turn”, asking whether the change is not 
so much a rejection of epistemological concerns but a product of them and a 
shift of emphasis. WM agreed, noting the meandering of “turns”, now this way, 
now that, common in academic disciplines, each turn attempting to correct for 
prior deficiencies. NBD wanted to know what is “the machine’s point of 
view”? WM responded by referring to the mediation enforced by the absolute 
consistency and complete explicitness of the digital medium and to the combi-
natorial negotiation implicit in modelling. He argued again for the crucial im-
portance of binary logic on the one hand and imaginative play against that foil 
on the other. 
RB noted that the fictionalizing trajectory of computational simulation, as in 
the example of the Virtual Paul’s Cross, is not yet accepted in the humanities. 
WM pointed to the mistaken belief that the computer is a fact-and-proof ma-
chine, a “knowledge-jukebox”, and advocated strong emphasis on the machine 
as an instrument of the imagination. RB mentioned the corrosive effects of 
simulation on mind/body dualism. 
GO, following up on NBD’s point about the “ontological turn”, offered the 
arresting counter-metaphor of epistemological and ontological concerns as 
diachronic intertwined strands, each dependent on the other. 
FJ, finally, asked what possibly we can mean by using such words as “intel-
ligence” and “perspective” when talking about machines. He asked if such talk 
is guilty of a category error. WM thought that the development and adoption of 
digital machinery was eroding such categorical distinctions, that drawing such 
lines has a long history of being redrawn to save outmoded ideas of the human. 
He may have quoted Evelyn Fox Keller, to the effect that asking if a product of 
computational biology is alive is beginning to look like an historical rather than 
a philosophical question. And he may have added that “intelligence” no longer 
looks like a single benchmark. 
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